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Summary. – This paper analyzes how economic and non-economic 
characteristics at the individual, household and community level affect the risk of 
victimization in Mozambique. We use a nation wide representative household 
survey from Mozambique with unique individual level information and show that 
the probability of being victimized is increasing in income, but at a diminishing 
rate. The effect of income is dependent on the type of crime, and poorer 
households are vulnerable. While less at risk of victimization, they suffer 
relatively greater losses when such shocks occur. Lower inequality and increased 
community level employment emerge as effective avenues to less crime. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper is a contribution to the literature on violence and the socio-economic 
determinants of individual and household level victimization. Crime is rightly perceived 
as a critical constraint on economic development, and the many ways in which crime 
and insecurity may affect human welfare in developing countries are aptly summarized 
by Fafchamps and Moser (2003). Consequently, efforts geared towards a better 
understanding of victimization and the formulation of comprehensive and effective 
policies to combat criminal behavior and minimize victimization are areas with 
potentially very high social and economic returns. This is certainly so in Mozambique. 
This war- and drought-stricken southern African country provides the case context for 
the present paper, and in spite of recent economic growth, Mozambique remains one of 
the poorest countries in the world. Mozambique also continues to suffer from a 
particularly violent economic and political history with roots going back to an extreme 
case of colonial domination and exploitation. Misguided economic policies in the 
immediate post-independence years added further complications, and the apartheid 
regime in South Africa fiercely undermined the development efforts of the 1980s.  
By way of background and to put crime in Mozambique in perspective, Table 1 
provides comparable statistics for homicide rates around the world. According to UN 
(2005) intentional homicide is reasonably accurately measured in the official police 
statistics, especially due to relatively high rates of reporting. Among  33 countries in the 
African region, only South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland report higher homicide rates 
than Mozambique, and based on world wide information from WHO (2002) it appears 
that only Columbia and Brazil in other regions experience a higher rate of homicides per 
100,000 people. Moreover, data in Dgedge et al. (2001) and Nizamo et al. (2006) 
suggest that the homicide rate in Mozambique increased significantly between 1994 and 
2000. In 1994, 188 homicides were recorded in the capital city of Maputo as compared 
to 225 in 2000. This is equivalent to homicide rates of 17.0 and 22.1, respectively. 
Finally, official crime data from the Mozambican Ministry of the Interior (2004) 
suggest that 39,061 and 40,630 criminal offences of different types took place in 
respectively 2002 and 2003 in the whole of Mozambique. With a population of around 
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18 million this indicates that no less than 220 per 100,000 people are victimized every 
year.1  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
  
While officially reported criminal statistics are available in Mozambique, they 
are as is the case elsewhere in the developing world not representative of the ‘true’ 
criminal situation. This is so first of all due to underreporting of crimes to the police. 
Alternative sources of information such as national surveys where information is 
available at the level of individuals and households are therefore a potentially rewarding 
avenue to improve our understanding of victimization in developing countries. Here we 
are fortunate that a nationally representative household survey was conducted in 
Mozambique during 2002 and 2003. It included a novel and informative section on 
individual level victimization on which the empirical section of this paper is built.  
The first and main objective of our paper is to provide a ‘map’ for identifying 
individuals with the highest risk of being subjected to crime of different kinds in 
Mozambique and to identify appropriate policy measures, or at least broad areas, where 
policy action appears to be effective in curtailing crime. In this part of our analysis, we 
look at the risk of being victimized due to property crimes and physical assaults of 
various kinds and identify the correlates of victimization. We subsequently look more 
narrowly at how income and the economic loss from property crime are related at the 
household level. Some 90% of those victimized in our data suffered a property loss, and 
we ask whether relatively well off households are victims of minor property crimes and 
poor households are victims of economically more disruptive crimes.  
When it comes to the question of which determinants of crime and victimization 
the analyst should include in empirical work, there is no clear cut, commonly agreed 
methodology. Economic theory calls attention to offender motivation and behavior 
(Gaviria and Pàges, 2002); and Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) suggest that criminal 
acts can be viewed as being directly linked to rational economic decision making by the 
offender. He/she carries out an a priori cost-benefit type analysis, where perceived 
economic costs and benefits are weighed against each other. Subsequent action is 
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decided on this basis. This suggests that the probability of being a victim can be 
expected to be a positive function of indicators related to income, education, and 
employment status as well as to the severity and effectiveness of the preventive and 
punitive actions taken by society. Thus, in economic attempts to explain crime, focus 
has generally been on how the offender perceives the optimal balance between gains 
from criminal activity, on the one hand, and associated constraints and risks (i.e. the risk 
of getting caught and the punishment involved), on the other. In addition, economic 
studies have generally focused on the application of household and community level 
data and information. In contrast, sociological studies have in their theories of criminal 
victimization put emphasis on victim behavior and individual (personal) level 
characteristics, which are at least to some extent non-economic in nature. Limited 
attention is paid to factors associated with offender motivation and perception. The most 
prominent perspectives in this group are the ‘lifestyle exposure’ and ‘routine activity’ 
theories associated with Hindelang et al. (1978) and Cohen and Felson (1979).  
Existing literature reveals with some notable exceptions a lack of attempts at 
trying to integrate economic and sociological perspectives.2 We believe this is 
unfortunate. Economic and sociological variables (and data at household, community as 
well as individual level) should be considered on par with each other to identify which 
individuals are most likely to be victims of criminal acts. A second main objective of 
the present paper is therefore to develop an integrated analysis where both economic 
and sociological factors are ‘allowed to play their part’. More specifically, we aim at 
helping to clarify the role of economic and sociological factors and to come better to 
grips with the value added of an integrated framework as a basis for future research. 
This is so both with the regard to the general analytical approach and in the search for 
appropriate policy measures. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 digs into existing economic and 
sociological literature to identify in an organized manner a pertinent set of specific 
determinants of victimization to be included in the empirical analysis. This is followed 
in Section 3 by an overview of our empirical methodology as well as the data used, 
together with some descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents results, while Section 5 
looks into robustness. Section 6 concludes and outlines policy implications. 
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2. DETERMINANTS OF VICTIMIZATION 
In this section, we aim at identifying the set of economic and sociological 
variables, which should enter our unified empirical framework. To structure the process 
we follow the sociological categorization of Cohen et al. (1981), and focus on the role 
played by: Exposure, guardianship, proximity to potential offenders, and attractiveness 
of potential targets. Definitions of these four factors are listed in the Appendix, and 
Table 2 provides a summary of the empirical variables at individual, household and 
community level associated with each category. The expected sign of each variable is 
also indicated.  
  
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 Within sociological theories of victimization the most cited contributions are as 
already noted the ‘lifestyle-exposure perspective’ and the ‘routine activity theory’. 
Meier and Miethe (1993) argue that the key difference between these frameworks is that 
the routine activity perspective was created to account for changes in crime rates over 
time, while the lifestyle-exposure approach was developed with a view to capturing 
differences in victimization risks across social groups. Common to the lifestyle and 
routine activity theories is their emphasis on ‘exposure’. When this factor is included in 
the analysis it amounts to saying that social and economic interactions increase the risk 
of victimization, and it is indeed a dimension that has been mostly ignored in economic 
approaches to crime and victimization. Accordingly, differences in the likelihood of 
being a victim can be explained by differences in the lifestyles of the potential victims. 
People, who are more active in the public domain and engage more in non-household 
activity, use less time within the family and are more frequently in contact with 
individuals with criminal tendencies. We believe this is captured by individual level 
variables such as gender and age as well and employment and marital status, in 
combination with selected characteristics of the household head. The sociological 
‘exposure’ argument is supported by empirical observation. Fajnzylber et al. (2000) 
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offer one of the few studies of victimization in the economic literature using individual 
level characteristics. It shows in line with the overview of sociological studies by Meier 
and Miethe (1993) that young, single, employed males have higher probability of being 
victimized than their demographic counterparts. 
Considering the guardianship factor next, the economic literature often refers to 
the nature of security measures (including distance to police station). They are expected 
to deter crime by increasing the offenders’ expected costs through a higher risk of being 
caught. As such this is a typical example of the economic incentives approach. Yet, in 
developing countries where public services of police and justice are often of 
questionable quality and in limited supply (or distributed unequally), private deterrence 
may well become more important. This may call into play a set of more sociological 
individual level factors related to members of the household and family composition, 
not captured in the typical economic analysis. The prediction in this kind of individual 
level analysis is that the risk of victimization should decrease with the number of 
members in a household and the share of males because the household is considered a 
social network of protection.3 Turning to existing studies, Fajnzylber et al. (2000) find 
no significant evidence of members of the household influencing the risk of 
victimization, and the review in Smith and Jarjoura (1989) concludes that the empirical 
evidence regarding the effect of the household size and family composition is mixed. To 
pursue this topic through the household and family composition variables listed in Table 
2 is interesting. 
In line with economic thinking, we also include distance to local police stations 
as a measure of guardianship. This measure (and other measures of the density of police 
personnel available in the nearby neighborhood) has to our knowledge mostly been 
included in more aggregate analysis of crime (see for example Fajnzylber et al., 2002a 
and 2002b). As in Zenou (2003) our prediction is to find a negative relationship 
between the police guardianship variable and the probability of being victimized. The 
underlying assumption is that the longer the distance to a local police station is the 
higher probability of being victimized. However, conclusions based on this variable 
should be handled with caution. Causality could potentially run from 
crime/victimization rates to distance to police as further elaborated on in Section 4. 
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Turning to the ‘proximity’ category, most explanatory variables considered here 
are at the community level; household head and individual education being the 
exceptions. The effect of education has been studied at different levels of aggregation 
and great care should be taken when trying to compare these results. In the following we 
limit our comments to the literature considering victimization studies. First, at the cross-
country level Soares (2004) finds that education reduces crime/the probability of being 
victimized. This is consistent with the result obtained in Fajnzylber et al. (2000) 
showing that the average educational attainment level in a society is positively 
associated with lower levels of victimization (even more so for assaults). At a more 
disaggregated (household) level, Gaviria and Pàges (2002) show that education of the 
household head increases the risk of being victimized; and at individual level Fajnzylber 
et al. (2000) find no significant effects of individual years of schooling on the risk of 
victimization. These results suggest that societies with higher levels of education tend to 
have lower rates of victimization, but whether an individual is more or less educated 
within a given society does not necessarily affect the probability of victimization. We 
therefore have no clear priors on the sign of the education variables. 
Considering the community level proximity characteristics captured here 
through five indicators it is to be expected that the closer people reside to relatively 
large groups of motivated offenders, the greater is the risk of victimization. This is 
supported by the empirical evidence of Meier and Miethe (1993). People living in larger 
urban areas are in this perspective more exposed to crime, a finding which has however 
been challenged by Fafchamps and Moser (2003) in the case of Madagascar. Here crime 
and insecurity are associated with isolation, not urbanization. Moreover, it is often 
argued that individuals living in areas with high unemployment rates are at a greater 
risk of becoming a victim. This corresponds with the results obtained by Cohen et al. 
(1981), who note that the risk of being victimized increases in poorer neighborhoods. 
This observation is also in line with Bourguignon et al. (2003), Demombynes and Özler 
(2005), Lederman et al. (2002) and Soares (2004). They consider the effects of 
inequality on crime, and find that income inequality affects crime rates positively. The 
share of foreigners in total district population is included here as well as a proxy for the 
social tension that potentially exists in a former colonized country. We predict that 
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larger social tension at the community level increases the probability of being 
victimized. This issue has to our knowledge not been directly addressed in the 
victimization literature before. 
Finally, if crime is motivated by instrumental (economic) ends it is generally 
expected that the greater the attractiveness of a target (income level and ownership of 
expensive and portable consumer goods as indicated in Table 2), the greater the risk of 
victimization. Yet, the effect of income on victimization risk is probably highly 
dependent on the nature of the crime as noted by Cohen et al. (1981). This has in our 
view not been adequately acknowledged in the economic literature and is an area where 
the current sociological and economic literatures differ substantially. For example 
Cohen et al. (1981) argue that in terms of assault the proximity, exposure and 
guardianship effects seem to dominate increased attractiveness caused by higher 
incomes. This may, ceteris paribus, lead to a negative relationship between income and 
the risk of assault, in contrast to the positive relationship emerging from economic 
thinking. Income also has two opposing effects on burglary victimization risk, and 
according to Cohen et al. (1981) it is not clear whether proximity, exposure and 
guardianship will dominate the influence from increased attractiveness in this case. 
According to the routine activity approach and consistent with the economic approach 
to victimization the risk of being a victim of larceny will always be increasing in 
income. Overall, it is not entirely clear a priori whether more economic resources allow 
individuals to avoid risky and vulnerable situations or whether this attracts more 
criminals (and thus increases the probability of becoming a victim). The attractiveness 
of individuals and their associated properties play an important role in increasing the 
risk of victimization, but higher levels of self-protection or guardianship will decrease 
individual risk. This can only be settled through empirical analysis. 
In sum, the sociological and economic literatures offer somewhat different 
underlying perspectives on the causal links behind victimization. It is equally clear that 
conclusions about the effects of specific economic and sociological variables (such as 
income) on the probability of becoming a victim vary. We therefore feel motivated to 
go on to analyze how different economic and sociological characteristics at the 
individual, household and community level affect the risk and loss of victimization in 
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Mozambique within a unified analytical framework. We highlight that while we have 
tried in Table 2 to link explanatory variables to one of the four sociological categories 
(exposure, guardianship, proximity, and attractiveness), there are potential ambiguities 
involved. A particular variable may in theory be associated with more than one 
category. This was referred to above when we discussed income. Another example is 
that gender may be associated with exposure (at the individual and household level) as 
well as guardianship. Females may not be quite as effective in protecting their 
household as males. The same kind of consideration may go for age. It might also be 
speculated that employment status and education are linked to attractiveness in addition 
to exposure and proximity, respectively. While this effect is at least in part controlled 
for by having income in the attractiveness category, these kinds of ambiguities form 
part of the motivation of the empirical part of this paper and are further discussed in 
Section 4.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY, DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Based on the literature survey in the previous section we take a reduced form 
approach to modeling the probability of an individual being victimized. Formally,  
 
),,,(),,|1Pr( ijccjcijccjcijcijc eqzxfqzxy     (1) 
 
where ijcy  is an indicator variable showing whether an individual i, who is a member of 
family j that lives in community c, was a victim of crime. The dependent variable takes 
on a value of one if the individual was victim of a crime and zero otherwise. ijcx , jcz , cq  
are vectors of respectively individual, household and community characteristics, 
whereas ijc is an individual error term. We also estimate (1) at the household level, the 
dependent variable 
h
jcy  indicating whether any member of the household was 
victimized. 
We use a probit model as our preferred specification, and interpret (1) as derived 
from an underlying latent variable model. In this model, we assume that 
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]0[1 3210  ijccjcijcijc eqzxy   with eijc being normally distributed. In 
Section 5 we test the robustness of our results with respect to the variables included. 
Choosing a logit or linear probability model instead of the probit specification would 
not affect the results reported. 
In the analysis of the relative loss from property crimes at the household level 
we rely on Heckman’s selection framework. For household j the relative loss, jcl , can be 
expressed as:  
 * *
0 1 2 1
h h
jc jc j jl z q u         (2) 
 
where superscript *h indicates that the vectors 
*h
jcz  and 
*h
jq  are not necessarily identical 
to their counterparts in the household level version of (1). A loss is only observed if: 
  
 02210  j
h
j
h
jc uqz  , ),1,,0,0(~),( 21 binormuu jj  (3) 
 
Equation (3) is our selection equation, and it is the household level equivalent of 
the underlying latent variable model above. Note that the samples used in estimating (1) 
and (3) differ. Households, who suffer a loss, are a subset of all households victimized.4  
In all estimations, appropriate household weights are used, taking into account 
the survey design (i.e. stratification of the survey sample and the clustering of 
enumeration areas). 
The data come from a nationally representative household survey (IAF) 
conducted in Mozambique during 2002 and 2003 by the National Institute of Statistics 
(INE). The survey took place over the space of a year, beginning in July 2002 and 
ending in June 2003. Data collection was carried out in clusters of nine and 12 
households in respectively rural and urban regions using a stratified sampling process 
with 21 strata (consisting of 10 provinces, each divided into a rural and an urban zone, 
plus Maputo city).5 A total of 858 clusters make up the sample of 8,700 households. 
After data collection, INE constructed household weights so as to ensure that the sample 
is representative at the national, regional and rural/urban levels in accordance with the 
1997 census.  
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The survey contains detailed information on individual characteristics including 
victimization entries on robbery, assault and larceny for around 43,000 individuals 
distributed among the 8,700 households. The survey instrument also includes questions 
on general characteristics of the individual and the household (including whether or not 
individuals have been victimized), daily expenses and home consumption, possession of 
durable goods, gifts and transfers received. Other expenses, which tend to occur with 
lower frequency than daily expenditures, such as school fees or purchases of clothing 
are covered as well. Additional details on the survey can be found in MPF et al. (2004). 
Full documentation of all aspects of the 2002-03 IAF survey is available in Portuguese 
from the National Institute of Statistics (INE, 2004). 
In our analysis we consider individuals aged 12 and above, but variables 
measured at the household level include information on the complete household, i.e. 
including members aged less than 12 years. A number of households had to be excluded 
due to missing information, so our final sample consists of 25,594 individuals 
distributed among 8,515 households. 
The questionnaire includes a novel and detailed section on victimization of each 
member of the family as well as related questions at the household level. These are the 
data on which we focus in this paper, and by way of background, we note that 6.4% of 
the respondents are of the view that criminal offenses are the main social problem in 
Mozambique at the moment. Moreover, 19% of the households answered that crime in 
their residential area had increased during the past 12 months. About half of the 
households in our sample felt unsafe when walking alone at night, even though only 
around 27.5% of the households have experienced a household member being 
victimized. Table 3 gives an overview of the types of crimes faced by the households. 
About two-thirds of the crimes can be characterized as some kind of theft or robbery, 
whereas rape, other sexual abuse, assault and domestic violence account for 4.8%. 
Interestingly, bribery does not come across as particularly serious in Mozambique. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
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From Table 3 it is also clear that most offences happen within the household 
premises. One third of crimes take place in the public domain, including in particular on 
roads (8.9%), in the market (3.2%) and at work (3.2%). 
In Section 2, we identified a number of potential determinants for being 
victimized, and information on these determinants can be obtained from the IAF survey 
questionnaire. The variables used in the analysis are listed together with descriptive 
statistics in Table 4 at the individual and at the household level. Most variables come 
straight out of the survey, but a few had to be constructed as explained below. To ease 
our brief overview of the determinants, they are grouped according to the classification 
in Table 2.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The first set of determinants considered here is those in the attractiveness group. 
The average monthly individual (nominal) income is 0.92 million Meticais (around 37 
US$) and the household income is on average 2.77 million Meticais (approximately 111 
USD).6 This figure might suggest underreporting of income. At the household level the 
real annual consumption is on average 14.1 million Meticais (562 US$), which as 
expected is somewhat above the GDP per capita of 212 US$ in 2000 reported in WDI 
(2003). Last, possession of durable goods, which is expected to make individuals more 
prone to being a victim, is measured by household dummy variables for having at least 
one TV, radio and bicycle in the household. Around half of households own a radio, 
whereas bicycle and TV ownership is more limited at 26.8% and 11.9%, respectively. 
The second group of determinants includes those in the exposure group, 
including gender (individual and household head), age (individual and household head), 
employment status (individual and household head), and marital status. At the 
individual level, 53.3% of the sample consists of women, but only around 22.8% 
(27.2% measured at the household (HH) level) of individuals has a woman as household 
head. The average age of individuals is 31.1 years, and for household heads this figure 
is 45.5 (43.4 years measured at the HH level). As already pointed out in Section 2, 
employment status is potentially an important determinant of victimization. At the 
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individual level, 11.7% of the sample is registered as being without work, and for 
household heads this figure is 7.0%. This corresponds with the average for sub-Saharan 
Africa and the information on Mozambique in WDI (2005). The final determinant at 
individual level in the exposure group considers the marital status of the individuals. 
Married or cohabiting partners make up 51.4% of the sample, 37.1% are single and the 
rest are either divorced or widowed. 
Proximity determinants such as education and the community variables are 
listed in the third group. Measures of the individual level of human capital, i.e. 
education, is represented by five dummy variables.7 At the level of the household head, 
education level is measured by a categorical variable with values from zero to four, 
constructed from the five dummy variables at the individual level.8 Some 24.7% of the 
sample has no education at all, and in general the educational level is as expected quite 
low. The next variable in the proximity group is the community unemployment rate, 
which is constructed from the survey data. It is measured at the district level (a 
geographical and administrative unit below the province level) by looking at the share 
of adults aged 18 years and above, who stated in the IAF that they did not have work 
and were not studying. With a mean unemployment rate of 15.7%, this community 
indicator is above the individual unemployment level referred to above.  
Turning to inequality at the district level we use the Gini-coefficient of real 
expenditure (i.e. spatially and temporally deflated) extracted from the survey data.9 The 
Gini-coefficient in our sample is 0.39. This is around the average for sub-Saharan 
Africa (WDI, 2005), and the reported 0.40 for Mozambique in 1997. The average 
population density is also recorded at the district level and is based on the 1997 census. 
In the sampled areas the average population density is around 1,181 persons per square 
kilometer. As a crude proxy for how integrated each community is we use the 
information in the 1997 census on the number of foreigners living in each district to 
form the share of foreigners in total district population. The average share of foreigners 
in our sample is quite low at 1.8%.  
Finally, we have descriptive statistics concerning the characteristics related to 
the guardianship characteristics, such as household size, family composition (share of 
adult males over the age of 18 in the household) and household distance to a police 
 14 
station. The average household size in the sample is 6.4 individuals (5.1 at the 
household level), and the adult male share is around 24.3%. Distance to the police 
station is reported by the household as a categorical variable corresponding to different 
lengths of time it takes to reach the nearest police station. A third of the population has 
less then half an hour to the nearest police station by foot, but variation is large and 
29.4% of the sample has more than a 120 minutes walk to the police.10 
 
4. RESULTS 
Some 26.6% of the households in our sample and 8.9% of people at the 
individual level experienced as shown in Table 4 one or another kind of criminal act(s) 
during the past 12 months according to the Mozambican IAF.11 At the individual level, 
the 8.9% were victimized at least once during 2002/03, but only 1.3% of the 25,594 
observations were physically assaulted. Most of the crimes registered in the survey were 
burglaries (5.5%), whereas cases of larceny were reported for 2.8% of the sample. 
 
(a) Determinants of Victimization 
Tables 5 and 6 present the main findings of our econometric analysis of the 
probability of being victimized (marginal effects at the mean of the data); and the 
discussion in what follows is organized in accordance with the four groups of 
determinants identified in Section 2. We start with the attractiveness and end with the 
guardianship variables, and possible ambiguities in classifying the various explanatory 
variables are alluded to. Table 5 documents the baseline formulation at the individual 
level including the 25,776 observations analyzing aggregate victimization as well as a 
disaggregation into three types, burglary, assault, and larceny.  Table 6 shows results of 
the analysis at the household level using household consumption as a proxy for income. 
This has been done recognizing that income may be measured with error.12 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
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(i) Attractiveness 
There is a statistically significant indication in the data of income being 
positively related to the probability of being victimized. This holds in all regressions in 
Tables 5 and 6 except for the larceny regression at the individual level (column 2, Table 
5). Moreover, results suggest that there exists a non-linear relationship between income 
and victimization. The probability of being victimized is in Mozambique increasing in 
income, but at a diminishing rate. However, looking at the specific crime types this 
result is driven by the non-linearity between burglary and income/consumption. These 
results confirm Cohen et al. (1981), who concluded that the effect of income on 
victimization risk is highly dependent on the nature of the crime. However, we do (even 
for assault) find a positive relationship between income/consumption both at the 
individual and the household level independent of the types of crime faced.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Possession of durable goods is another attractiveness variable which is often 
expected to affect the risk of victimization positively. We are not able to confirm this 
relationship in our aggregate data. However, when disaggregating victimization by 
types of crime, we find a negative and significant  relation between owning a TV or a 
radio and a positive relation with owning a bike in the assault regression. While assets 
may be expected to make potential victims more attractive, the ownership of a bicycle, a 
TV or a radio is also related to exposure, so there is ambiguity here. Accordingly, we 
believe our empirical result is due to the fact that (i) the TV and radio variables proxy 
for the amount of time individuals spend at home, and (ii) bicycle ownership is related 
to how much time individuals spend away from their immediate neighborhood. This 
implies that this particular result is probably more due to exposure associated with 
bicycle, TV and radio ownership, overriding the effect from the attractiveness 
dimension. 
It follows that the results for the attractiveness variables are consistent with 
Fafchamps and Minten (2006). They conclude that certain forms of crime respond to 
economic incentives while others do not. This also reinforces the argument that both 
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economic and sociological dimensions should be considered when analyzing 
victimization.  
 
(ii) Exposure 
The above observations are reinforced by looking at determinants in the 
exposure group. We generally find a significant influence of exposure variables on the 
probability of being victimized both at the individual and the household level. At the 
individual level we confirm that males have a higher probability of being victimized 
than females. However, members of female headed families have a higher probability of 
becoming a crime victim both in the individual and household level regressions. Males 
clearly tend to be more exposed than females, and the latter observation is in all 
likelihood driven by ambiguity vis-à-vis the guardianship dimensions of gender. 
Another result is that older people have a higher probability of victimization driven by 
property crime. This holds even though we include several attractiveness controls 
(people accumulate assets over time and thereby increase their attractiveness for 
potential offenders). All in all, this might suggest that the ambiguity vis-à-vis 
guardianship may be effective. Older people are in Mozambique less able to protect 
themselves at the individual level, ceteris paribus, possibly linked to their physical 
ability to protect themselves. In contrast, when persons live in households with an older 
household head this reduces as expected the risk of victimization (individual level 
regressions), probably linked in part to the experience embodied in age.  This result is, 
however, only significant in the assault regression when aggregating the analysis to the 
household level.  
In the individual level regressions we see (in accordance with the literature) that 
employed people have a higher probability of being victimized than their unemployed 
and studying counterparts. It suggests that exposure is indeed important, but we also 
note that this result is largely driven by the property crime (burglary) regression. We 
have tried to control for individual attractiveness in order to account for ambiguity in 
categorizing employment; but we cannot exclude that there are elements of 
attractiveness involved reinforcing the exposure link. Finally, single people are less 
victimized than their marital and divorced counterparts in Mozambique. This is opposite 
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to what is normally found in the literature (Fajnzylber et al., 2000), but our result holds 
for all types of victimization. This indicates that it is a common characteristic of the 
Mozambican case, probably related to greater exposure of these groups (noting that we 
have controlled for the fact that guardianship may be different for single people). 
 
(iii) Proximity 
Looking at proximity characteristics it appears that individuals, who are 
educated (measured vis-à-vis those without any education), are more likely to be 
victimized (except for assaults in the individual level regressions). This is in accordance 
with Gaviria and Pàges (2002). They argue that educated people are more proximate to 
crime than less educated people. In the Mozambican context, we do not find this 
convincing. It is more appropriate to suggest that being educated may transmit some 
kind of signal of being a more attractive target of crime, even if we highlight that we 
have tried to control for other factors of influence, including attractiveness. In any case, 
proximity and exposure (and probably also guardianship to some extent) are probably 
all playing a role here, the net effect being positive. Unemployment at the community 
level tends to increase the individual probability of being victimized. We believe this is 
a result that is largely and directly driven by the fact that living in areas with high 
community unemployment increases the probability of being assaulted.  
Consistent with Bourguignon et al. (2003) and Soares (2004), we find 
indications of a positive relationship between inequality and the risk of victimization. 
When disaggregating by type of crime the relationship between inequality and assaults 
as well as burglary turn out insignificant. That is, victimization in terms of larceny is 
sizeable, significant and positively related to income inequality whereas the relationship 
turns both insignificant (for assaults and burglary) and of much smaller size (for 
assaults). This suggests that for these types of crime, proximity is less important, but it 
may also reflect to some extent that there are counter veiling effects from ambiguity in 
relation how to classify inequality. Finally, there is as expected an indication of high 
population density being associated with greater risk of being burglarized in 
Mozambique both in the individual and the household level analysis. In sum, proximity 
does indeed seem to matter, but the general picture is complex.  
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(iv) Guardianship 
Finally, when we turn to determinants classified in the guardianship category, it 
is clear that household size yields different results depending on whether the analysis is 
done at the individual or at the household level. At the individual level, household size 
is significant and negatively related to victimization in accordance with typical lifestyle 
theories. Family members tend to look after each other and the household does seem to 
serve as a network of protection (Fajnzylber et al., 2000). We find a positive and weakly 
significant relationship between household size and victimization at the household level 
driven by property crimes. This suggests that the greater exposure caused by more 
members outweighs the guardianship effect, illustrating the unavoidable ambiguity in 
classifying a variable such as household size. Yet, this observation does illustrate the 
need for bringing economics and sociological approaches together.  
A larger share of adult males in a household seems to reduce the risk of 
becoming a victim, and according to Table 5 this is especially so for burglaries, which is 
in all likelihood a clear guardianship effect. Turning to distance to the police station, 
this variable may be expected to have an effect on the probability of criminals being 
caught and therefore on the risk of victimization, in line with the economics approach. 
However, coefficients do not depict a clear picture, except that when distances are large, 
the risk of victimization decreases (noting that we have controlled for a series of other 
variables related to exposure, proximity and attractiveness). This may well suggest that 
police services are not altogether effective in terms of guardianship, but we wish to note 
that reverse causality may also be at play, i.e. police stations may be placed where 
criminal rates and the risk of victimization is higher. Our results correspond with the 
findings in Fajnzylber et al. (2000) for Latin America, and they do seem to suggest that 
the Fafchamps and Moser (2003) result for Madagascar, where crime increases with 
distance to urban centers, does not hold in the case of Mozambique.13  
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(b) Economic Loss from Victimization 
As a measure of the severity of economic loss due to victimization (caused by 
property crimes, but excluding assaults), we use the logarithm of the ratio of monetary 
loss to yearly household income. For the 1,937 households with economic loss due to 
crime the mean ratio is 25.3% of yearly household income (9.2% excluding households 
reporting loss greater than yearly income). The similar mean for the entire population is 
6.1%. The few observations with very high loss ratios (i.e. greater than 100% of yearly 
income) can however be included in the analysis since leaving them out has no effect on 
the estimates of the effect of household income on relative loss.14 We are particularly 
interested in the relationship between relative loss and household assets and therefore 
include household consumption and household consumption squared as explanatory 
proxy variables together with household level variables included in Table 4 – except 
distance to police station. In the robustness analysis we show that the coefficients on 
consumption and consumption squared are not sensitive to which other explanatory 
variables are included. The selection equation is the same as the household level probit 
regression reported in Table 6. Provincial and rural/urban dummies together with 
community variables and distance to police station are excluded from the loss 
regression. Thus, we implicitly assume that these variables have no effect on the size of 
the economic loss from victimization when controlling for the household level variables 
described above.   
Table 7 presents the results when controlling for selection and – for comparison 
– without controlling for selection. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
The test for dependent equations reported in Table 7 illustrates the need for 
using a selection equation framework. Our interest centers on the estimates of the 
consumption terms. The convex relationship has an estimated turning point of around 
300 million Meticais (around 12,000 USD). This means that for all but a few 
households, the expected marginal loss ratio is decreasing in income. Poorer 
households, though less at risk of being victimized, lose a relatively large share of their 
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income when they are victimized. This highlights that the vulnerability of the poor is 
also in this area of social and economic life a dimension that deserves careful attention 
by policy makers. Helping combat crime is of particular importance to the poorest 
which are hardest hit, in relative terms. 
  
5. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
In this section, we analyze the robustness of the results presented in Section 4. 
We investigate how the results are affected when one or more of the variables 
previously identified as potential determinants of victimization are omitted. In an 
analogous way we then turn to investigating whether our results on the relation between 
economic loss from victimization and income are robust to changes in the specification. 
Following the literature on extreme bounds analysis, we run a systematic series 
of probit regressions to assess the sensitivity of the estimated coefficients to omission of 
specific groups of variables. Specifically, we divide the variables of Table 6 into two 
groups. One group contains what we denote as core variables. These are included in all 
subsequent regressions. The remaining variables belong to the second group – denoted 
secondary variables. The victimization dummy is then regressed on all possible linear 
combinations of the secondary variables including, in all the regressions, the full set of 
core variables. In other words, if the group of secondary variables is said to consist of k 
variables we perform 2k-1 regressions. 
The selection of core variables can of course take different directions. Yet, our 
main focus is on how individual and household characteristics affect the probability of 
being victimized. We therefore include as core variables all individual and household 
characteristics, excluding the three dummy variables indicating household possession of 
durable goods (due to their insignificance) and the distance to police station dummies 
because of the possible endogeneity mentioned above. This implies that the group of 
secondary variables is made up of 12 variables: Possession of durable goods (three 
variables), distance to police station (four variables), unemployment rate, inequality, 
average level of educational attainment, population density, and integration. 
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[Table 8 about here] 
 
Table 8 shows the summary statistics from this analysis. The first three columns 
show the maximum, minimum and average of the point estimate over all possible 
regressions discussed above. Column (4) shows the average standard deviation of the 
point estimates. Columns (5) to (7) contain the main results from the analysis. They 
reflect respectively the share of regressions where the point estimate is significant at the 
5% level, the share with a positive point estimate (not necessarily significant), and 
finally the share of regressions with a negative point estimate. Column (8) gives the 
average t-value over all regressions. 
The core variables are remarkably robust. Only the dummy variable for higher 
education change sign in any combination with the secondary variables, and except for 
individual income squared, education and employment status of the household head 
they are always significant at the 5% level. The square of individual income is ‘on 
average’ significant at the 10% level. Regarding the secondary variables the results are 
more mixed. Only the dummy variable indicating the longest distance to a police station 
is significant in all the regressions, while the smallest and second longest distance 
dummies retain the same sign in all regressions. The attractiveness variables (TV, radio 
and bike) also have the same sign in all regressions, though never significant. The 
unemployment rate, inequality and population density have sizeable shares of 
significant variables and together with integration the sign never varies. The average 
level of educational attainment is the only other variables where the point estimate 
switches sign depending on which secondary variables are included in the regression. 
Turning to the robustness of the economic loss from victimization we use a 
similar methodology. More specifically – in light of our findings above – we retain the 
same selection equation (3) in all the regressions. For the regression equation (2) we use 
the variables of primary interest, income and income squared, and household size as 
core variables. The group of secondary variables consists of gender, age, education 
(four variables), employment and the share of adult males at the household level, and 
possession of a TV, radio and a bicycle. Proceeding as described above leaves us with 
2,047 regressions.  
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[Table 9 about here] 
 
Table 9 summarizes our findings for the three core variables.15 As is evident 
from Table 9 the coefficient estimates of the income terms are very robust with respect 
to the specification of the regression equation. In all but a few regressions, they are 
clearly significant at the 5 percent level and the variability between regressions is small. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper departed from the observation that economics and sociology point in 
somewhat different directions when trying to understand victimization in developing 
countries. Economics suggests that focus should be on the potential offenders and their 
evaluation of costs and benefits of antisocial behavior. This implies, for example, that 
higher incomes among potential victims are, ceteris paribus, expected to lead to a 
greater risk of victimization. Moreover, economists have with few exceptions paid no 
attention to variation by type of crime and individual characteristics of the victims. 
Sociology, on the other hand, has been more concerned with the individual 
characteristics of potential victims, including in general a more complicated set of 
explanatory categories. This approach has, however, been hampered by poor links 
between theory and data, inadequate measures of key concepts and failure to specify 
clear functional forms of the relationship between various sets of variables (Meier and 
Miethe, 1993). 
While the sociological approach may to some reflect an idea that ‘smacked of 
‘blaming the victim’’ as formulated by Meier and Miethe (1993), it is equally correct 
that the economic approach may potentially suffer from its trying to move forward on 
‘one leg’ only, ignoring that there may be need to control for influential sociological 
variables before conclusions are drawn up. On this background, we proceeded to 
studying victimization in the case of Mozambique, relying on a unified analytical 
framework where both economic and sociological dimensions were allowed to speak. 
The choice of country case is justified both with a view to the fact that Mozambique 
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belongs to the category containing the poorest countries in the world and because a 
novel and revealing, nationally representative household survey with relevant 
information on victimization at the individual, household and community levels has 
recently become available. 
In discussing the identification of our explanatory variables, we highlighted that 
there are potential ambiguities involved in their categorization according to the four 
main factors emphasized in the sociological literature (attractiveness, proximity, 
exposure and guardianship). Individual level variables such as gender and age may, just 
to mention some examples, belong to several categories. Nevertheless, individual level 
variables do turn out to matter in a statistically significant and robust manner in our 
integrated analysis. Thus, the sociological approach helps ensure that potentially 
important differences between analyzing victimization from an individual and a 
household perspective are accounted for, and this does appear to matter. For example: 
 Males have a higher probability of being victimized, but members of female 
headed households are more at risk of becoming a victim, probably due to lower 
levels of guardianship. Preventive policies geared towards supporting female 
headed households emerge as important, in contrast with what follows from the 
former observation. 
 The guardianship variable ‘household size’ reduces the risk of becoming a 
victim when controlling for individual level characteristics. At the household 
level the conclusion is the reverse (driven by the burglary relationship). The 
bigger the household, the bigger the risk of victimization. There is in other 
words merit in viewing guardianship as related not only to public (police) 
initiatives but also to private aspects of deterrence, a dimension an offender view 
on victimization would not capture.  
Our analysis also showed that analyzing victimization from an aggregate 
economic point of view misses that the explanatory factors behind different types of 
crime may differ. We brought out a variety of such examples, including:  
 Inequality affects victimization, but only through larceny. Burglary and assault 
victimization are not affected. Similarly, it appears that lower unemployment 
will only decrease the assault rate, leaving burglary and larceny unaffected. It 
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follows that a package of preventive policies geared towards employment 
creation and limiting inequality would affect larceny and assaults, but leave 
burglary unaffected. The general implication is that one-dimensional policy 
action is unlikely to be effective. To achieve several different victimization 
goals, a series of complementary policy measure are required. On the other 
hand, if policy makers assign priority to for example the assault issue (as has 
been the case in Mozambique more recently), attention should certainly be paid 
to the reduction of unemployment. In contrast, lower inequality will not per se 
make assaults go away. 
In sum, by drawing upon the sociological literature we believe to have 
uncovered a more informed set of causal relationships than would have emerged in a 
‘pure’ economic analysis. For sure, our ‘map’ for identifying individuals with the 
highest risk of victimization is more accurate than would otherwise have been the case. 
This is important both in general and with a view to the fact that policy makers may 
have specific groups of people or specific types of crime in mind as deserving priority 
attention. 
At the same time, our integrated analysis confirmed the critical importance of 
approaching victimization from an economic angle. While exposure was mainly viewed 
from a sociological perspective, attractiveness, proximity and guardianship are all 
dimensions, which are narrowly related to economic considerations. Their empirical 
significance is also clear, including in particular:  
 The probability of being victimized is increasing in income, but at a diminishing 
rate. The latter aggregate effect is mainly driven by the non-linearity between 
property crimes and income, but it is nevertheless clear that economic 
attractiveness matters across the board. The implication of our analysis is for 
example that both private and public guardianship measures should be 
promoted, taking due account of the importance of individual exposure. 
Moreover, it would appear that institutions offering effective insurance against 
victimization should be considered and promoted as an integral part of an 
overall strategy against crime and victimization. 
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 Poorer households are less at risk of victimization. They exhibit lower 
attractiveness. They are also more vulnerable. They suffer proportionally larger 
losses when crime occurs. It is not straightforward to derive policy implications 
from this result, as a complex interpersonal metric of utility based on fractions 
of income are looming in the background. Yet, we do find the result of interest. 
It merits careful attention by policy makers as well as further study, and we 
suggest that this characteristic is likely to be linked to poorer people possessing 
more limited guardianship than better off people. This implies inter alia that the 
design of criminal policy should take careful account of the distribution of 
preventive resources across social groups. 
In our review of the importance of employment status (classified under 
exposure) and education (classified under proximity) we also noted that there are in all 
likelihood elements of attractiveness involved in explaining the impact of the specific 
empirical variables included, especially in the education case. Thus, our analysis 
suggests that being employed and educated increase the risk of victimization, over and 
above the impact captured through individual income, which we controlled for. This 
might induce a negative incentive towards seeking employment outside the home, so 
policy makers may wish to focus attention on safety while workers are commuting 
alongside measures addressed to combat attractiveness crime. Furthermore, education 
does appear to increase victimization risk. It is not obvious what should be done about 
this, but policy makers should be aware that this carries with it the risk that better 
educated workers may eventually migrate or change behavior. Different kinds of 
insurance may be one way of dealing with this problem. 
In sum, we believe to have justified that it is indeed possible to increase our 
understanding of victimization following the advice of Meier and Miethe (1993) of 
incorporating sociological victimization theories into a unified theory of crime where 
functional relationships are clearly specified. We acknowledge the ambiguities 
involved, but wish to reiterate by way of general conclusion that the robust causal 
patterns identified in this paper can serve both as an input into policy formulation and as 
a more comprehensive starting point for future victimization research.  
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NOTES 
 
1 For further country specific context on Mozambique see for example UN (2005). Reference can also be 
made to the following website maintained by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
http://www.irinnews.org/frontpage.asp?SelectRegion=Southern_Africa&SelectCountry=Mozambique. 
 
2 See Fafchamps and Moser (2003) and Demombynes and Özler (2005) for two important recent studies 
where a broad range of explanatory variables are relied on in explaining crime in respectively Madagascar 
and South Africa. While these two articles study crime we focus in this paper on the other side of the 
criminal event, victimization. 
 
3 Looking at the available evidence on guardianship factors it is important when interpreting the results to 
distinguish between ‘aggregate’ household level and ‘micro’ individual level studies. Moreover, Meier 
and Miethe (1993) note that few studies of guardianship have included sufficient controls for other factors 
influencing victimization risk. We focus here on the few existing individual level studies, which are 
closer in nature to the objective of the present paper. See for example Gaviria and Pàges (2002) for a 
recent analysis at the household level. 
 
4 Of households being victimized 90.2% suffered a property loss. We highlight that it is only these 90.2% 
of the victimized, who enter the selection equation (3) with a loss. The welfare loss suffered due to non-
property crime can of course be substantial, but an analysis hereof is well beyond the scope of the present 
paper. 
 
5 Mozambique has 10 administrative provinces (Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Nampula, Sofala, Zambézia, 
Manica, Tete, Gaza, Inhambane and Maputo) in addition to Maputo city. 
 
6 Exchange rate 1US$ = 25,000 Meticais or 1Metical = 0.00004 US$.  
 
7 Educ0 = Never went to school; Educ1 = Went to school but no grade obtained; Educ2 = literate and 
primary 1st completed; Educ3= primary 2nd completed; Educ4 = higher and technical educations. 
 
8 Thus, average education is calculated as (# of persons with edu0=1x0 + # of persons with 
edu1=1x1…)/# of persons. 
 
9 See MPF et al. (2004) for a detailed description of the construction of real consumption. 
 
10 The categorical values correspond to the time it takes to reach the police station on foot: 1 = 0-29 min.; 
2 = 30-44 min.; 3 = 45-60 min.; 4 = 60-119 min.; 5 =120+ min. When answering the question on distance 
to the police station households could choose mode of transportation. For some households distance on 
foot had to be constructed. This was done by giving all households that did not answer ‘on foot’, the 
corresponding average value for households in the same enumeration area that answered ‘on foot’. 
Moreover, we assumed that households which reported that they had more than 30 minutes transport by 
car to the nearest police station has been categorized under category 5. Similarly, households responding 
that they had more than 60 minutes by bicycle are put into category 5.  
 
11 In the sample, there are a few cases of people, who suffered more than one offense. They are however 
so few that they do not affect our overall results. In this paper we focus on whether people were 
victimized or not. 
 
12 Consumption figures are only available at the household level. In the analysis we also used household 
consumption to instrument household income. In order to capture the non-linearity in household income 
we created instruments interacting household real consumption with continuous exogenous regressors in 
our specification (household real consumption squared was a weak instrument for squared income 
according to our first stage regressions). We were left with eight instruments, exogenous by construction. 
The qualitative results reported in Table 6 do not change using this approach. 
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13 We included the control variable ‘distance to urban centres and markets’ and this did not change our 
distance to police station result. Moreover, we found an indication of distance to urban centres and 
markets being negatively related to the risk of being victimized in all specifications. 
 
14 We tried several different ‘cut-off’ values for the relative loss (i.e. only using observations with relative 
loss less than 10, 30 or 50% of yearly income). All estimations produced results very similar to using the 
full sample. 
 
15 A full set of regressions is available upon request. 
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APPENDIX 
The sociological categories in the routine activity framework are defined as follows 
(Cohen et al., 1981): 
a) Exposure 
The physical visibility and accessibility of persons or objects to potential 
offenders at any given time or place.  
b) Proximity 
The physical distance between areas where potential targets of crime reside and 
areas where relatively large populations of potential offenders are found. 
c) Guardianship 
The effectiveness of persons or objects in preventing violations from occurring, 
either by their presence alone or by some sort of direct or indirect action. 
d) Target Attractiveness 
The material or symbolic desirability of persons or property targets to potential 
offenders, as well as the perceived inertia of target against illegal treatment.  
e) Properties of Crimes 
The features of specific crimes that act to constrain strictly instrumental actions 
by potential offenders. For example, many larcenies are less difficult to commit 
and require less knowledge of victim routine activities than do burglaries. 
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Table 1: Homicide rates in perspective  
 
  Homicides per 100,000 
people   
Mozambique 22.1 
Angola 9.4 
Botswana 12.9 
Lesotho 50.6 
Namibia 16.3 
Sao Tome and Principe 6.2 
South Africa 59.7 
Swaziland 50.9 
Tanzania 7.8 
Uganda 20.9 
Zambia 8.1 
Zimbabwe 7.2 
The Americas 19.3 
South East Asia 5.8 
Europe 8.4 
Eastern Mediterranean 7.1 
Western Pacific 3.4 
All countries 8.8 
Note: Mozambique is based on data for Maputo only. 
This may give an upward bias, since homicide rates are 
generally higher in urban areas. The figures reported 
for Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania and Uganda are based on simple averages of 
estimates from two or three different sources. The table 
does not present statistics for African countries with a 
homicide rate below five. These countries include: 
Algeria (1.0), Benin (4.5), Burkina Faso (0.4), 
Cameroon (0.4), Cote d'Ivoire (3.3 – based on an 
average of two estimates), Djibouti (3.5), Egypt (0.4), 
Eritrea (2.0), Ghana (2.1), Libya (2.3), Madagascar (4.7 
– based on an average of two estimates), Mali (0.7), 
Mauritania (0.8), Mauritius (2.5 – based on an average 
of three different estimates), Morocco (0.5), Niger 
(0.9), Nigeria (1.5), Rwanda (4.5), Senegal (1.2), 
Seychelles (4.4 –based on an average of two different 
estimates), Sudan (0.3) and Tunesia (1.2).  
Source: Mozambique: Nizamo et al. (2006), 
Demombynes and Özler (2005), Fafchamps and Minten 
(2006), Fajnzylber et al. (2002), UN (2005) and WHO 
(2002). 
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Table 2: List of empirical variables by sociological category  
Group Variables Exposure Guardianship Proximity Attractiveness 
Individual  Individual income       x (?) 
 Gender (Female = 1) x (-)    
 Age x (-)    
 Employment status (Employed) x (+)    
 Marital status (Single) x (+)    
 Education   x (?)  
Household Household consumption       x (?) 
 Possessions: Durable goods    x (+) 
 HH gender (Female = 1) x (-)    
 HH age x (-)    
 HH employment status x (+)    
 HH education   x (?)  
 Distance to police station  x (-)   
 Members in household  x (-)   
 Family composition  x (-)   
Community Population density     x (+)   
 Unemployment rates   x (+)  
 Distribution of Income: Inequality   x (+)  
 Average level of educational attainment   x (-)  
  Integration     x (+)   
Note: All regressions in the econometric analysis also include regional and urban/rural dummies as 
community variables. In parenthesis are the expected sign of the variable on victimization. Income is 
listed with a ‘?’ since income involves different predictions depending on the type of crime. We 
expect (i) larceny to be positively linear in income, (ii) burglary to be increasing in income, but at a 
diminishing rate, and (iii) assault to be indeterminate.    
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Table 3: Victimization statistics 
Type of crime Percent 
A. Purse snatching 6.2 
B. Tried or took an object of value 3.4 
C. Robbed of a bicycle 4.1 
D. Robbed of any type of vehicle 0.3 
E. Cattle stolen 5.5 
F. Victim of other theft 47.7 
G. Victim of rape 0.4 
H. Insult or offensive 7.3 
I. Threats 1.8 
J. Assault 2.7 
K. Sexual abuse 0.3 
L. Domestic Violence 1.4 
M. Bribery 0.5 
N. Other 18.5 
Total 100 
  
Locality of crime Percent 
At home 66.9 
On roads 8.9 
In public transport 1.6 
In the market 3.2 
At work 3.2 
In places of leisure 1.2 
Other 14.9 
Total 100 
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Table 4: Summary statistics 
      Individual HH 
Group Classification Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Individual and 
HH level 
Type of crime Victim 0.089 0.284 0.266 0.442 
 Burglary 0.055 0.228 0.169 0.375 
  Larceny 0.028 0.164 0.086 0.281 
  Assault 0.013 0.113 0.039 0.194 
Individual  Attractiveness Individual income (monthly) 0.924 7.295     
Individual  Exposure Gender 0.533 0.499     
  Age 31.106 16.489   
  Employment status: Employed 0.667 0.471   
  Employment status: Studying 0.216 0.411   
  Employment status: Unemployed 0.117 0.322   
  Marital status: Single 0.371 0.483   
  Marital status: Married 0.101 0.301   
  Marital status: Married Polygam 0.074 0.262   
  Marital status: Cohabit 0.339 0.473   
  Marital status: Divorced 0.059 0.236   
  Marital status: Widow 0.056 0.230   
Individual  Proximity Education: Educ0 0.247 0.431     
  Education: Educ1 0.382 0.486   
  Education: Educ2 0.207 0.405   
  Education: Educ3 0.107 0.309   
  Education: Educ4 0.057 0.233   
Household Attractiveness HH income (monthly)     2.777 12.896 
  HH consumption (yearly)   14.056 32.427 
  Possession of durable goods: TV 0.172 0.378 0.119 0.324 
  Possession of durable goods: Radio 0.553 0.497 0.494 0.500 
  Possession of durable goods: Bicycle 0.296 0.457 0.268 0.443 
Household Exposure HH gender 0.228 0.420 0.272 0.445 
  HH age 45.467 14.513 43.432 15.317 
  HH employment status 0.930 0.254 0.942 0.234 
Household Proximity HH education 0 0.239 0.427 0.278 0.448 
  HH education 1 0.351 0.477 0.359 0.480 
  HH education 2 0.209 0.407 0.187 0.390 
  HH education 3 0.103 0.303 0.093 0.291 
  HH education 4 0.098 0.298 0.082 0.275 
Household Guardianship Household size 6.441 3.407 5.067 2.794 
  Adult male share 0.243 0.170 0.245 0.207 
  Distance to police station 1 0.441 0.496 0.373 0.484 
  Distance to police station 2 0.123 0.329 0.124 0.330 
  Distance to police station 3 0.069 0.254 0.076 0.265 
  Distance to police station 4 0.073 0.260 0.087 0.281 
  Distance to police station 5 0.294 0.456 0.340 0.474 
Community Proximity Unemployment rate 0.157 0.140 0.136 0.129 
  Distribution of Income: Inequality 0.394 0.095 0.385 0.099 
  Average level of educational attainment 1.420 0.590 1.340 0.573 
  Population density 1.181 3.515 0.860 2.938 
    Integration 0.018 0.006 0.018 0.006 
N   Total observations 25,594 8,515 
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Table 5: Individual level probit results 
      Victim Burglary Larceny Assault 
Group Classification Variable 
Marginal 
effects t-stats 
Marginal 
effects t-stats 
Marginal 
effects t-stats 
Marginal 
effects t-stats 
Ind  Attractiveness Income (x1000) 1.305*** (2.57) 0.942*** (3.51) 0.190 (1.60) 0.127** (2.03) 
  Income squared (x1000) -0.003* (1.68) -0.003*** (2.95) 0.000 (1.09) 0.000 (1.21) 
Ind  Exposure Gender (x10) -0.551*** (8.93) -0.297*** (8.19) -0.152*** (5.04) -0.028** (2.12) 
  Age (x100) 0.015*** (8.39) 0.107*** (9.13) 0.040*** (4.58) -0.001 (0.23) 
  Empl. status: Studying -0.028*** (2.61) -0.014** (2.24) -0.003 (0.54) -0.005 (1.63) 
  Empl. status: Unemployed -0.022*** (3.33) -0.011** (2.39) -0.006** (1.98) -0.002 (1.20) 
  Marital status: Married 0.085*** (7.11) 0.056*** (5.95) 0.019*** (2.99) 0.003 (0.95) 
  Marital status: Polygam 0.138*** (9.16) 0.075*** (6.49) 0.043*** (4.71) 0.015*** (3.36) 
  Marital status: Cohabit 0.090*** (9.48) 0.048*** (7.09) 0.027*** (4.74) 0.010*** (3.33) 
  Marital status: Divorced 0.161*** (8.06) 0.067*** (5.65) 0.050*** (4.29) 0.038*** (3.94) 
  Marital status: Widow 0.144*** (7.06) 0.075*** (5.58) 0.053*** (3.90) 0.013** (2.06) 
Ind Proximity Education: Educ1 (x10) 0.295*** (4.72) 0.198*** (5.10) 0.108*** (3.63) -0.003 (0.24) 
  Education: Educ2 (x10) 0.448*** (4.64) 0.361*** (4.96) 0.114** (2.53) -0.003 (0.19) 
  Education: Educ3 (x10) 0.446*** (3.19) 0.258** (2.23) 0.161** (2.47) -0.011 (0.49) 
  Education: Educ4 (x10) 0.571*** (3.10) 0.423*** (2.82) 0.206** (2.16) -0.014 (0.37) 
HH Attractiveness Durable goods: TV (x10) 0.049 (0.61) 0.008 (0.19) 0.069 (1.54) -0.029** (2.16) 
  Durable goods: Radio (x10) -0.056 (1.30) -0.031 (1.09) -0.003 (0.14) -0.019* (1.75) 
  Durable goods: Bicycle (x10) 0.055 (1.12) 0.037 (1.05) -0.012 (0.59) 0.026** (2.17) 
HH Exposure HH Gender (x10) 0.405*** (5.33) 0.217*** (4.16) 0.118*** (3.48) 0.037** (2.19) 
  HH Age (x100) -0.142*** (7.69) -0.082*** (6.49) -0.040*** (5.04) -0.012** (2.36) 
  HH Employment status (x10) -0.085 (1.02) -0.068 (1.31) -0.030 (0.74) 0.006 (0.30) 
HH Proximity HH Education 1 (x10) -0.050 (0.86) -0.074** (1.96) -0.004 (0.19) 0.014 (0.88) 
  HH Education 2 (x10) 0.021 (0.29) -0.056 (1.09) 0.026 (0.82) 0.071*** (2.98) 
  HH Education 3 (x10) -0.072 (0.70) -0.105 (1.46) 0.010 (0.22) 0.036 (1.24) 
  HH Education 4 (x10) 0.010 (0.07) -0.108 (1.42) -0.008 (0.20) 0.163** (2.02) 
HH Guardianship Household size -0.004*** (5.35) -0.002*** (4.50) -0.001*** (2.68) -0.001*** (2.96) 
  Adult male share -0.042*** (2.88) -0.028*** (2.90) -0.002 (0.34) -0.001 (0.17) 
  Distance to police 2 0.002 (0.30) -0.002 (0.37) 0.008* (1.88) -0.003** (2.31) 
  Distance to police 3 -0.006 (0.43) -0.001 (0.13) 0.002 (0.40) -0.001 (0.50) 
  Distance to police 4 -0.017* (1.68) -0.009 (1.44) -0.002 (0.43) -0.004** (2.12) 
  Distance to police 5 -0.024*** (2.98) -0.018*** (3.28) 0.001 (0.30) -0.002 (1.19) 
Com Proximity Unemployment rate 0.104 (1.49) 0.070 (1.54) 0.014 (0.46) 0.037*** (2.91) 
  Inequality 0.087** (2.12) 0.035 (1.20) 0.040*** (2.79) 0.003 (0.46) 
  Average educational level -0.006 (0.53) -0.007 (0.89) 0.000 (0.08) 0.001 (0.49) 
  Population density 0.001 (0.82) 0.001* (1.94) -0.001* (1.66) 0.000 (0.11) 
  Integration -0.528 (1.04) -0.415 (1.13) -0.099 (0.32) 0.051 (0.48) 
Including regional and rural/urban dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
    Observations 25594 25594 25594 25594 
   Pseudo R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 
Note: Probit, marginal effects at the mean of all variables. *, **, *** indicates significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Including only 
individuals, who are living in a household reporting non-zero (positive) income. Base: Individual male, individual no education, individual 
employed, individual single, household head male, household head unemployed, household head no education, distance to police station 1, Maputo. 
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Table 6: Household level probit results 
      Victim Burglary Larceny Assault 
Group Classification Variable 
Marginal 
effects t-stats 
Marginal 
effects t-stats 
Marginal 
effects t-stats 
Marginal 
effects t-stats 
HH Attractiveness Real cons. (x1000) 2.386*** (4.36) 1.505*** (3.74) 0.706*** (3.25) 0.198* (1.95) 
  Real cons. squared (x1000) -0.003*** (2.99) -0.002*** (3.21) -0.001** (2.23) 0.000 (0.99) 
  Durable goods: TV 0.011 (0.35) -0.004 (0.22) 0.027 (1.22) -0.016*** (3.02) 
  Durable goods: Radio -0.015 (0.96) -0.010 (0.76) -0.001 (0.15) -0.008* (1.91) 
  Durable goods: Bicycle 0.020 (1.19) 0.022 (1.53) -0.005 (0.58) 0.009 (1.62) 
HH Exposure HH Gender 0.050** (2.47) 0.011 (0.69) 0.022** (2.04) 0.015** (2.15) 
  HH Age (x100) -0.063 (1.42) 0.012 (0.34) -0.026 (0.94) -0.047*** (3.04) 
  HH Employment status 0.022 (0.82) 0.004 (0.22) 0.007 (0.46) 0.006 (0.86) 
HH Proximity HH Education 1 0.060*** (3.11) 0.029** (2.00) 0.035*** (3.34) 0.006 (0.96) 
  HH Education 2 0.102*** (4.14) 0.074*** (3.72) 0.045*** (2.83) 0.023** (2.52) 
  HH Education 3 0.048* (1.72) 0.005 (0.21) 0.045** (2.51) 0.009 (0.89) 
  HH Education 4 0.058* (1.65) 0.026 (0.90) 0.029 (1.58) 0.037** (2.06) 
HH Guardianship Household size 0.010*** (3.35) 0.006*** (2.69) 0.002 (1.36) 0.001 (0.90) 
  Adult male share -0.003 (0.06) -0.030 (0.87) 0.030 (1.38) 0.013 (1.01) 
  Distance to police 2 0.047 (1.46) 0.007 (0.27) 0.049** (2.53) -0.012** (2.06) 
  Distance to police 3 -0.026 (0.54) -0.005 (0.13) 0.006 (0.29) -0.003 (0.36) 
  Distance to police 4 -0.037 (0.98) -0.029 (1.06) 0.003 (0.15) -0.013* (1.65) 
  Distance to police 5 -0.065** (2.23) -0.067*** (2.82) 0.017 (1.06) -0.008 (1.06) 
Com Proximity Unemployment rate 0.312 (1.30) 0.226 (1.23) 0.071 (0.49) 0.160*** (3.06) 
  Inequality 0.150 (1.09) 0.069 (0.57) 0.127* (1.91) -0.001 (0.04) 
  Average educational level -0.005 (0.14) -0.031 (0.96) 0.015 (0.57) 0.003 (0.28) 
  Population density 0.005 (1.30) 0.006** (2.08) -0.002 (1.18) 0.000 (0.11) 
  Integration -0.928 (0.53) -1.495 (0.96) 0.134 (0.09) 0.531 (1.22) 
Including regional and urban/rural dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
    Observations 8515 8515 8515 8515 
   Pseudo R-squared 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.10 
Note: Probit, marginal effects at the mean of all variables. *, **, *** indicates significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Base: Household head 
male, household head unemployed, household head no education, distance to police station 1, Maputo. 
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Table 7: Loss from victimization 
      Heckman OLS 
Group Classification Variable Mean t-stats Mean t-stats 
HH Attractiveness Real cons. (x100) -1.915*** (3.98) -1.249*** (3.10) 
  Real cons. squared (x100) 0.003*** (3.71) 0.002*** (3.04) 
  Durable goods: TV -0.276 (1.10) -0.265 (1.23) 
  Durable goods: Radio -0.294*** (2.57) -0.286*** (2.60) 
  Durable goods: Bicycle -0.181 (1.49) -0.141 (1.22) 
HH Exposure HH Gender -0.066 (0.42) 0.042 (0.28) 
  HH Age 0.007* (1.66) 0.006 (1.52) 
  HH Employment status -0.162 (0.64) -0.136 (0.58) 
HH Proximity HH Education 1 -0.467*** (2.78) -0.342** (2.22) 
  HH Education 2 -0.562** (2.37) -0.305 (1.42) 
  HH Education 3 -0.788*** (3.19) -0.626** (2.52) 
  HH Education 4 -0.756** (2.20) -0.567* (1.90) 
HH Guardianship Household size -0.100*** (4.42) -0.078*** (3.64) 
    Adult male share -0.283 (0.74) -0.268 (0.79) 
Observations   1937 Uncensored (8409) 1937 
Wald test of independent equations Chi2(1) = 5.69 P-value: 0.02     
Note: *, **, *** indicates significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Base: Household head male, 
household head unemployed, household head no education. The coefficient estimates for the selection equation are 
not shown. Due to identical specification they are very close to the estimates reported for the household level probit 
in Table 5. 
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Table 8: Sensitivity analysis –summary statistics 
          
Group Classification Variable Max Min Mean AvgSTD PercSig Perc+ Perc- AvgT 
Ind  Attractiveness Income (x1000) 13.006 11.003 11.958 4.463 1 1 0 2.682 
  Income squared (x1000) -0.024 -0.031 -0.027 0.016 0.00 0 1 1.747 
Ind  Exposure Gender (x10) -4.656 -4.745 -4.706 0.527 1 0 1 8.932 
  Age (x100) 0.139 0.135 0.137 0.017 1 1 0 8.234 
  Empl. status: Studying -0.268 -0.287 -0.277 0.109 1 0 1 2.541 
  Empl. status: Unemployed -0.202 -0.230 -0.218 0.069 1 0 1 3.158 
  Marital status: Married 0.562 0.542 0.552 0.079 1 1 0 7.017 
  Marital status: Polygam 0.776 0.751 0.762 0.083 1 1 0 9.200 
  Marital status: Cohabit 0.671 0.657 0.664 0.071 1 1 0 9.389 
  Marital status: Divorced 0.848 0.821 0.836 0.108 1 1 0 7.740 
  Marital status: Widow 0.781 0.758 0.770 0.111 1 1 0 6.940 
Ind Proximity Education: Educ1 (x10) 2.593 2.459 2.531 0.537 1 1 0 4.713 
  Education: Educ2 (x10) 3.426 3.237 3.342 0.723 1 1 0 4.623 
  Education: Educ3 (x10) 3.484 3.102 3.246 1.001 1 1 0 3.241 
  Education: Educ4 (x10) 4.195 3.727 3.931 1.253 1 1 0 3.137 
HH Attractiveness Durable goods: TV (x10) 0.716 0.384 0.516 0.686 0 1 0 0.752 
  Durable goods: Radio (x10) -0.333 -0.506 -0.419 0.386 0 0 1 1.084 
  Durable goods: Bicycle (x10) 0.484 0.286 0.379 0.426 0 1 0 0.888 
HH Exposure HH Gender (x10) 3.342 3.075 3.195 0.585 1 1 0 5.465 
  HH Age (x100) -1.236 -1.287 -1.260 0.167 1 0 1 7.538 
  HH Employment status (x10) -0.690 -0.870 -0.773 0.703 0 0 1 1.100 
HH Proximity HH Education 1 (x10) -0.353 -0.577 -0.466 0.528 0 0 1 0.883 
  HH Education 2 (x10) 0.509 0.064 0.271 0.647 0 1 0 0.417 
  HH Education 3 (x10) -0.009 -0.811 -0.454 0.968 0 0 1 0.470 
  HH Education 4 (x10) 0.888 -0.082 0.343 1.250 0 0.98 0.02 0.276 
HH Guardianship Household size -0.034 -0.040 -0.037 0.007 1 0 1 5.104 
  Adult male share -0.345 -0.382 -0.365 0.131 1 0 1 2.784 
  Distance to police 2 0.108 0.004 0.067 0.076 0 1 0 0.890 
  Distance to police 3 0.072 -0.081 0.012 0.114 0 0.60 0.40 0.381 
  Distance to police 4 -0.005 -0.192 -0.092 0.089 0.01 0 1 0.991 
  Distance to police 5 -0.129 -0.230 -0.175 0.061 1 0 1 2.872 
Com Proximity Unemployment rate 1.292 0.657 0.981 0.601 0.12 1 0 1.635 
  Inequality 0.823 0.640 0.738 0.357 0.66 1 0 2.072 
  Average educational level 0.152 -0.086 0.039 0.086 0 0.71 0.29 0.727 
  Population density 0.015 0.005 0.010 0.007 0.21 1 0 1.442 
  Integration -1.137 -5.661 -3.717 4.698 0 0 1 0.791 
Note: See table 5 for description of base household. Max, Min and Mean are respectively the maximum, minimum and mean value of the point 
estimate over all regression. AvgSTD and AvgT are averages over the standard deviations and t-values, respectively. PercSig gives the percentage 
times the coefficient was significant. Perc+ indicates the number of times the coefficient had a positive sign and analogously for Perc-. 
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Table 9: Selection sensitivity analysis – summary statistics 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Variable Max Min Mean AvgSTD PercSigni Perc+ Perc- AvgT 
Household income (x10) -1.539 -2.969 -2.122 0.751 0.98 0 1 2.9 
Household income squared (x100) 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.001 1 1 0 3.0 
Household size -0.077 -0.140 -0.104 0.027 1 0 1 3.9 
Note: Max, Min and Mean are respectively the maximum, minimum and mean value of the point estimate over all regression. 
AvgSTD and AvgT are averages over the standard deviations and t-values, respectively. PercSig gives the percentage times the 
coefficient was significant. Perc+ indicates the number of times the coefficient had a positive sign and analogously for Perc-. 
Selection equation as specified in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
